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COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES V. MENDEZ: 
DEFENDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE  
“PROVOCATION RULE” 
Layal Bishara* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ensures 
the right of the people “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”1 
Additionally, it ensures that “no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”2 This amendment has been a cornerstone in the discussion on 
law enforcement and its use of force, abuse of power, and the 
interaction between the police and the public. Recently, the Supreme 
Court of the United States weighed in on this discussion in County of 
Los Angeles v. Mendez.3 On May 30, 2017, the Court overruled in part 
and remanded in part the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Mendez v. County 
of Los Angeles.4  
In Mendez v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit held that 
police officers can be sued when they use reasonable force if they have 
unlawfully entered a premises in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 
thereby violating an individual’s right to privacy; this is known as the 
“Provocation Rule.”5 The Provocation Rule provides that “if a police 
officer recklessly promotes a potentially violent confrontation with a 
Fourth Amendment violation, the officer is liable for any injury caused 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., International 
Relations and Political Science, University of Southern California, 2015. Thanks to Professor 
Simona Grossi for her invaluable feedback and unrelenting encouragement throughout the writing 
process, to the members of Loyola of Los Angles Law Review for their hard work, and to family 
and friends for their support. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 2. Id. 
 3. 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017). 
 4. 815 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017).   
 5. Id. at 1193–94. 
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by a subsequent use of force that results from that confrontation, even 
if the use of force itself was reasonable.”6 
The Supreme Court overturned this “Rule,” holding it 
unconstitutional.7 This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s 
decision regarding the constitutionality of the Provocation Rule, and 
the question of whether the officers’ use of force and the resulting 
injury would have been prevented had the officers secured a search 
warrant. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In October 2010, an arrest warrant was issued for Ronnie O’Dell, 
“who was believed to be armed and dangerous.”8 Officers Conley and 
Pederson of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department were 
among the officers assigned to capture O’Dell.9 They received a tip 
that O’Dell was residing at the home of Paula Hughes in Lancaster, 
California, and pursued the tip.10 Officers were instructed to go to the 
front door and confront Hughes, and Officers Conley and Pederson 
were instructed to go and search the back of the residence.11 The 
officers at the front door entered the residence without displaying a 
warrant, despite Hughes’s request to see one.12 However, they did not 
find O’Dell in the house.13 Meanwhile, Officers Conley and Pederson 
were behind the house and found three sheds, one of which was 
occupied by Angel Mendez and a pregnant woman, Jennifer Garcia 
(now Jennifer Mendez).14 Mendez and Garcia had been living in this 
shack in Hughes’s backyard for about 10 months at that time, and 
Mendez had built the shed himself.15 The officers were unaware of the 
presence of Mendez and Garcia, and entered the shed without a search 
warrant, knocking, or announcing themselves.16 
 
 6. Radley Balko, SCOTUS Eliminates the ‘Provocation Rule’, THE WASH. POST (May 30, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/05/30/scotus-eliminates-the-
provocation-rule/?utm_term=.71cbf6dddfde. 
 7. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1544. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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Mendez and Garcia were inside the shed, napping on a futon.17 
When the officers entered, Mendez woke up and picked up a BB gun 
he was holding so as to set it down on the floor, as he thought it was 
Hughes who had entered the shed.18 Mendez kept this BB gun for 
fending off rats and other pests that lived outside.19 The officers assert 
that Mendez pointed the gun “somewhat south towards Deputy 
Conley,” so they opened fire and fired fifteen rounds, severely injuring 
both Mendez and Garcia.20 Mendez’s injuries resulted in the 
amputation of his leg.21 
Mendez and Garcia filed suit in federal court against the County 
of Los Angeles and Officers Conley and Pederson, asserting three 
Fourth Amendment claims: (1) “the deputies executed an 
unreasonable search by entering the shack without a warrant”; (2) “the 
deputies performed an unreasonable search because they failed to 
announce their presence before entering the shack”; and (3) “the 
deputies effected an unreasonable seizure by deploying excessive 
force in opening fire after entering the shack.”22 
The District Court found the officers responsible for the first two 
claims, failing to announce presence before entering and entering 
without a warrant, but found that the officers did not use unreasonable 
force since they were under the reasonable belief that a gun was 
pointed at them and threatening them.23 However, the District Court 
invoked the Ninth Circuit’s “Provocation Rule.”24 The Provocation 
Rule holds that “an officer’s otherwise reasonable (and lawful) 
defensive use of force is unreasonable as a matter of law, if (1) the 
officer intentionally or recklessly provoked a violent response, and (2) 
that provocation is an independent constitutional violation.”25 
Consequently, “the District Court held the deputies liable for 
excessive force and awarded [Mendez] $4 million in damages.”26 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 1544–45. 
 19. Id. at 1544. 
 20. Id. at 1545. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id.; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (holding that use of force was 
reasonable if the officers were under a reasonable belief that a firearm was threatening their lives). 
 24. Mendez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 11-04771-MWF (PJWx), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
115099, at *65–66 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013). 
 25. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1545. 
 26. Id. 
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The County and officers appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which affirmed in part and reversed in part the District 
Court’s ruling.27 In pertinent part, the Ninth Circuit ultimately 
affirmed the District Court’s interpretation of the Provocation Rule.28 
It affirmed that the Provocation Rule only requires “that the deputies’ 
unconstitutional conduct ‘created a situation which led to the shooting 
and required the officers to use force that might have otherwise been 
reasonable,’”29 and that here, the officers “recklessly or intentionally” 
brought about the shooting by unlawfully entering the shack.30 
However, it used a different approach for its analysis, concluding that 
“‘basic notions of proximate cause’ would support liability even 
without the Provocation Rule because it was ‘reasonably foreseeable’ 
that the officers would meet an armed homeowner when they ‘barged 
into the shack unannounced.’”31 
The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari, and on 
May 30, 2017, issued an opinion overturning in part and remanding in 
part the decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.32 
III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
In its opinion, the Supreme Court focused on the constitutionality 
of the Ninth Circuit’s Provocation Rule.33 Under the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning, the Provocation Rule may apply if police force has been 
deemed reasonable by the standards set out in Graham v. Connor, 490 
U.S. 386 (1989).34 The rule then “instructs the court to ask whether 
the law enforcement officer violated the Fourth Amendment in some 
other way in the course of events leading up to the seizure.”35 If there 
is a separate Fourth Amendment violation, it may “render the officer’s 
otherwise reasonable defensive use of force unreasonable as a matter 
of law.”36 To start with, the Court asserted that the definitions of the 
 
 27. Mendez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 815 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1539 
(2017). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 1193 (quoting Espinosa v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 539 (9th Cir. 
2010)). 
 30. Id. at 1194. 
 31. Id. at 1194–95. 
 32. Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017). 
 33. See id. at 1546–49 (discussing the constitutionality of the Ninth Circuit’s Provocation 
Rule). 
 34. Id. at 1546–47. 
 35. Id. at 1546. 
 36. Id. (quoting Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1190–91 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
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two claims differ:  
an excessive force claim is a claim that a law enforcement 
officer carried out an unreasonable seizure through a use of 
force that was not justified under the relevant circumstances. 
It is not a claim that an officer used reasonable force after 
committing a distinct Fourth Amendment violation such as 
an unreasonable entry.37 
The Court went on to assert that conflating excessive force claims 
with other Fourth Amendment claims, as is done through the 
Provocation Rule, is incorrect.38 If the elements of an excessive force 
claim set out in Graham are not met, then there is no excessive force 
claim, and the analysis should end there.39 The analysis for any other 
Fourth Amendment claim should be conducted separately.40 The 
Court noted that, although the Ninth Circuit attempted to limit the use 
of the Provocation Rule “to only those distinct Fourth Amendment 
violations that in some sense ‘provoked’ the need to use force,” this 
limitation is riddled with problems.41 The test for whether 
“provocation” has occurred is (1) “the separate constitutional violation 
‘[created] a situation which led to’ the use of force,” and (2) “the 
separate constitutional violation must [have been] committed 
recklessly or intentionally.”42 
The Court held that the first prong of the test, whether the 
violation created a situation that led to the use of force, is a “vague 
causal standard” that deviates from the normal proximate cause test 
that courts are familiar with.43 Additionally, the Court held that the 
second prong of the test is a subjective standard looking at the intent 
of the officers, while the “reasonableness of a search or seizure is 
almost always based on objective factors.”44 
The Court further asserted that the purpose of the Provocation 
Rule, holding law enforcement “liable for the foreseeable 
consequences of all of their constitutional torts,” is one that can be 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1548. 
 42. Id. (quoting Mendez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 815 F.3d 1178, 1193 (9th Cir. 2016)). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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achieved through other means of the law.45 Even if plaintiffs cannot 
seek relief through a claim of excessive force, if the officers entered 
unlawfully or without a warrant, they can seek damages on those 
claims alone.46 
The Court further overturned the Ninth Circuit’s proximate cause 
conclusion.47 The Ninth Circuit held that the injury was “proximately 
caused” by the warrantless entry of Mendez’s shack.48 Instead of 
analyzing the foreseeability of the risk created by the warrantless 
entry, as would be proper since the warrantless entry was the 
applicable constitutional violation, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the 
causal proximity  between the “unannounced” entry and the shooting. 
The Court held that this was an improper analysis because the officers 
were not liable for the “unannounced” entry due to qualified 
immunity.49 
The Court did not, however, completely dismiss the Ninth 
Circuit’s proximate cause theory.50 In fact, it remanded the issue and 
ordered the court of appeals to apply a proximate cause analysis to the 
applicable violation, which was the warrantless entry.51 The Court 
further ordered the Ninth Circuit to apply a traditional proximate cause 
analysis to this issue, rather than the “murky causal link” it applied in 
its decision.52 
IV.  HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
The Provocation Rule was first addressed by the Ninth Circuit in 
Alexander v. City & County of San Francisco.53 In Alexander, police 
officers and a hostage negotiation team were sent to a man’s house 
with a forcible entry inspection warrant due to the resident’s 
 
 45. See id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. at 1549. 
 48. Mendez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 815 F.3d 1178, 1193 (9th Cir. 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 
1539 (2017).   
 49. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1549. “Qualified immunity is an immunity from civil suit extended 
to police officers, administrators, and other public officials who are alleged to have violated the 
rights of a person while the official was performing a discretionary function of office, if the 
official’s conduct does not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that would 
have been known to a reasonable person.” Qualified Immunity, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER 
LAW DICTIONARY (Desk ed. 2011). 
 50. See Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1549. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. 29 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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unresponsiveness and failure to comply with housing inspection 
requests and orders.54 When the officers and negotiators arrived, the 
resident, Quade, refused to let them in and threatened to use his gun.55 
The officers in turn entered with the intent of arresting him, but Quade 
fired his gun and shots were exchanged, resulting in Quade’s death.56 
The Ninth Circuit found that if the officers entered Quade’s house with 
the intention of arresting him, they violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights since they only had an inspection warrant rather than an arrest 
warrant.57 The court further found that summary judgment was 
inappropriate in regard to whether excessive force was used: 
The force which was applied must be balanced against 
the need for that force: it is the need for force which is at the 
heart of the consideration of the Graham factors. If the jury 
were to find that the officers entered in order to help the 
inspectors inspect . . . then the jury may also conclude that 
the force used . . . was excessive in relation to the purpose for 
which it was used . . . . On the other hand, if the jury were to 
conclude that the officers entered for the purpose of arresting 
Quade, they may conclude that storming the house was in 
fact commensurate with need (arresting a man who had 
threatened to shoot anyone who came into his house), and 
hence that the force was reasonable.58 
The lack of an arrest warrant caused reasonable force to become 
unreasonable, even if the force used was reasonable in the moment of 
the shooting itself.59 By connecting the use of force to the purpose of 
entry, the court essentially held that a jury could have found that a lack 
of a warrant would have made the force unreasonable since the officers 
“used excessive force in creating the situation which caused Quade to 
take the actions he did.”60 In finding that a jury could have found that 
an unlawful entry led to a situation in which force was provoked, the 
court laid the foundation for the Provocation Rule.61 
 
 54. Id. at 1358. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1360. 
 58. Id. at 1367. 
 59. See id. at 1366 n.12. 
 60. Id. at 1366. 
 61. See id. at 1367. 
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In another excessive force case, Billington v. Smith,62 the Ninth 
Circuit succinctly interpreted the standard set out in Alexander: 
[W]here an officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a 
violent confrontation, if the provocation is an 
independent Fourth Amendment violation, he may be held 
liable for his otherwise defensive use of deadly force. 
In Alexander, the officers allegedly used excessive force 
because they committed an independent Fourth 
Amendment violation by entering the man’s house to arrest 
him without an arrest warrant, for a relatively trivial and non-
violent offense, and this violation provoked the man to shoot 
at the officers. Thus, even though the officers reasonably 
fired back in self-defense, they could still be held liable for 
using excessive force because their reckless and 
unconstitutional provocation created the need to use force.63 
 In Espinosa v. City & County of San Francisco,64 an excessive 
force case with facts similar to those in Mendez, the Ninth Circuit 
further applied the Provocation Rule.65 Officers entered an attic and 
shot a man because one of the officers “believed that he saw something 
black in [the man’s] hand that looked like a gun,” even though the man 
did not have a weapon or make any threats.66 The court denied the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment because there was 
“evidence that the illegal entry created a situation which led to the 
shooting and required the officers to use force that might have 
otherwise been reasonable.”67 This established that provocation does 
not require the act to elicit a violent response from a plaintiff; the 
officers simply must act unconstitutionally, and the unconstitutional 
act must lead to a shooting or use of deadly force.68  
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit’s Provocation Rule asserts that “where an 
officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation, if 
the provocation is an independent Fourth Amendment violation, he 
 
 62. 292 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 63. Id. at 1189.  
 64. 598 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 65. See id.  
 66. Id. at 533. 
 67. Id. at 539. 
 68. See id.; see also Mendez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 815 F.3d 1178, 1193 (9th Cir. 2016). 
51.2_BISHARA_V.7 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/19  7:08 PM 
2018] DEFENDING THE “PROVOCATION RULE” 515 
may be held liable for his otherwise defensive use of deadly force.”69 
Liability can attach to officers if their unconstitutional conduct—
unlawful entry, for example—“created a situation which led to the 
shooting and required the officers to use force that might have 
otherwise been reasonable.”70 
In Mendez, the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s 
Provocation Rule for several reasons: (1) the rule conflates two 
different Fourth Amendment violations that require two different 
analyses; (2) the test used to enforce the “provocation” limitation is 
incorrect; and (3) the purpose of the rule, to hold law enforcement 
officials liable for their actions, can be achieved through other 
means.71 The Court further asserted that the causation analysis 
conducted by the Ninth Circuit was incomplete and vague.72 This 
Comment analyzes the constitutionality of the Provocation Rule, 
namely whether an excessive force claim and an unlawful entry claim 
can be analyzed together, and the causal connection between the 
unlawful entry and resulting harm in Mendez. 
A.  Excessive Force Claim Analysis 
The analysis for determining whether excessive force has been 
used was set out in Graham v. Connor.73 The Court in Graham 
established that “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force 
must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”74 The Court 
held that because “police officers are often forced to make split-second 
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 
evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular 
situation,” the analysis must consider the position and specific 
circumstances that the officers may be in.75 As with other analyses that 
use the reasonableness standard, in an excessive force analysis, “the 
‘reasonableness’ inquiry . . . is an objective one: the question is 
whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of 
the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their 
 
 69. Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 70. Espinosa, 598 F.3d at 539. 
 71. See Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546–48 (2017). 
 72. Id. at 1548–49. 
 73. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
 74. Id. at 396. 
 75. Id. at 396–97. 
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underlying intent or motivation.”76 
In assessing reasonableness, the court must also balance the 
“extent of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights 
against the government’s interest,” i.e., the court must balance the 
“force that was used by the officers against the need for such force.”77 
In evaluating the government’s interest, courts consider “(1) the 
severity of the crime; (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate 
threat to the officers’ or public’s safety; and (3) whether the suspect 
was resisting arrest or attempting to escape.”78 In assessing the extent 
of intrusion upon the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, courts 
must evaluate “the type and amount of force inflicted.”79 Lastly, courts 
“balance the gravity of the intrusion on the individual against the 
government’s need for that intrusion.”80 Additionally, “the parties 
‘relative culpability’ i.e., which party created the dangerous situation 
and which party is more innocent, may also be considered.”81 
B.  Unlawful Entry Claim Analysis 
Although assessing an unlawful entry claim also analyzes 
whether the entry was reasonable or unreasonable, “[u]nder the Fourth 
Amendment, warrantless searches inside a home are ‘presumptively 
unreasonable.’”82 A violation of the knock-and-announce rule will 
also constitute an unlawful search or seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.83 “The most basic constitutional rule in this area is that 
searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established 
 
 76. Id. at 397; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (holding that in analyzing the 
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure, “it is imperative that the facts be judged against an 
objective standard . . . .”). 
 77. Espinosa v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 537 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 78. Id.; Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
 79. Espinosa, 598 F.3d at 537 (quoting Miller v. Clark Cty., 340 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 
2003)). 
 80. Id. (quoting Miller, 340 F.3d at 964). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Walters v. Freeman, 572 F.App’x 723, 727 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Brigham City v. 
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). 
 83. Lusine Ajdaharian, Knocking Down the “Knock-and-Announce” Rule: A Casenote on 
Hudson v. Michigan, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 183, 183 (2007); see 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2012) (“The 
officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or 
anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is 
refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution 
of the warrant.”). 
51.2_BISHARA_V.7 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/19  7:08 PM 
2018] DEFENDING THE “PROVOCATION RULE” 517 
and well delineated exceptions.”84 Such exceptions include exigent 
circumstances under which a warrant could not be obtained.85 The 
burden of showing exigency rests on the government to “demonstrate 
exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of 
unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries.”86 In 
order to show this, the government must prove that “the exigencies of 
the situation made that course imperative.”87 
Courts have found exigent circumstances that allow a warrantless 
entry in situations “where there is danger to human life, [and] 
protection of the public becomes paramount and can justify a limited, 
warrantless intrusion into the home.”88 Such circumstances also 
depend “somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought to be in 
progress as well as the hazards of the method of attempting to reach 
it.”89 
C.  Similarities Between the Two Analyses 
While the analyses for an unlawful entry claim and an excessive 
force claim look to different factors and begin with different 
presumptions, they share many similarities. The standard in analyzing 
both claims is one of reasonableness, i.e., whether the force used was 
reasonable or whether the entry without a warrant was reasonable.90 
Additionally, both look to the specific circumstances and facts of the 
use of force/entry in assessing reasonableness.91 Furthermore, they are 
almost always brought within the same action; generally, if a plaintiff 
 
 84. Watson v. City of Bonney Lake, 506 F.App’x 555, 557 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971)); see Erwin Chemerinsky, Fourth Amendment 
Stops, Arrests, and Seizures in the Context of Qualified Immunity, 25 TOURO L. REV. 781, 791 n.62 
(2009) (“[Y]ou are going to have cases where it is obvious that you do not need a case on point 
because the language of the statute or the language of the constitutional provision is so clear, and 
the conduct is so wrong that anybody would know that this is unlawful.”). 
 85. See Alexander v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting 
that the plaintiff relied on “Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980), in which the Supreme 
Court held that absent exigent circumstances, police may not enter a suspect’s home to make a 
felony arrest without a warrant.”); see also Callahan v. Millard Cty., 494 F.3d 891, 899 (10th Cir. 
2007) (finding that the law was clearly established that without consent or exigent circumstances, 
a warrantless entry of the home was unlawful), rev’d on other grounds, 555 U.S. 223. 
 86. Watson, 506 F.App’x at 558 (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984)). 
 87. Id. at 557 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971)). 
 88. Hall v. Smith, 170 F.App’x 105, 106 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Holloway, 
290 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2002)). 
 89. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459 (1948). 
 90. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Walters v. Freeman, 572 F.App’x 723, 
727 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 91. See McDonald, 335 U.S. at 459; Graham, 490 U.S. at 398. 
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brings an unlawful entry claim, they also bring an excessive force 
claim.92 The court in Walters went as far as to assert that “[b]ecause 
the facts viewed in the light most favorable to Walters 
demonstrate that [the officer’s] entry into her apartment was unlawful, 
we must also conclude that they support finding a constitutional 
excessive-force violation . . . ‘if an arresting officer does not have the 
right to make an arrest, he does not have the right to use any degree of 
force in making the arrest.’”93 The same can apply to an unlawful entry 
claim, since an unlawful arrest and unlawful entry claim are 
essentially the same violation.94 
Although seemingly different on their face due to the specific 
factors and balancing test for an excessive force claim set out in 
Graham, in practice, the analyses of both claims will often lead to the 
same outcome, particularly through a proximate cause analysis as 
examined below.95 Additionally, the Graham factors require 
considering “(1) the severity of the crime; (2) whether the suspect 
posed an immediate threat to the officers’ or public’s safety; and (3) 
whether the suspect was resisting arrest or attempting to escape.”96 All 
of these factors parallel those the court must look at in determining 
whether exigent circumstances were present and justified a 
warrantless entry.97 If these factors are met, both exigency and 
reasonable force would be found, and vice versa. 
In Mendez, the Supreme Court was concerned about finding 
liability for excessive force based on a successful unlawful entry claim 
when an excessive force claim would not have survived on its own.98 
Imposing liability on an officer could be a violation of the officer’s 
due process rights because the officer would be held liable based on a 
 
 92. See, e.g., Walters, 572 F.App’x at 723.; Watson v. City of Bonney Lake, 506 F.App’x 555 
(9th Cir. 2013); Bashir v. Rockdale Cty., 445 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2006); Alexander v. City & Cty. 
of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 93. Walters, 572 F.App’x at 729 (quoting Bashir v. Rockdale Cty., 445 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th 
Cir. 2006)). 
 94. See Barragan v. City of Eureka, No. 15-cv-02070-WHO, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118603, 
at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2016) (holding that an unlawful arrest analysis requires looking to whether 
it was “objectively reasonable” to carry out such an arrest by assessing the “totality of the 
circumstances”). 
 95. See infra Section E. 
 96. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Espinosa v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 537 
(9th Cir. 2010). 
 97. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459 (1948); Hall v. Smith, 170 F.App’x 
105, 106 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 98. Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1547 (2017). 
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violation that upon immediate examination, did not occur. However, 
as asserted above and as will be discussed in the proximate cause 
analysis of the unlawful entry and resulting force, even if the force was 
not excessive in the isolated circumstance of the shooting itself, both 
the unlawful entry analysis and the excessive force analysis call for an 
assessment of all of the surrounding circumstances.99 Such 
circumstances must include the means by which the officer entered the 
premises where he used the force in controversy.100 
D.  Purpose of the Provocation Rule 
The principles of the Provocation Rule are familiar with and 
similar to basic tort law causation principles. In Monroe v. Pape,101 
the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil 
remedy for victims of unconstitutional searches and seizures, should 
be “read against the background of tort liability that makes a man 
responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.”102 Similarly, 
the Provocation Rule holds police officers liable for the harm caused 
by their unlawful entry.103 
While excessive force and unlawful entry are two different Fourth 
Amendment violations, there are situations in which an unlawful entry 
leads to the use of force and resulting injury.104 If constitutional torts 
follow the same reasoning as regular tort liability, not only should the 
force itself be analyzed, but the events leading up to the use of force 
should also be considered.105 Indeed, “[p]olice officers should not be 
allowed to create dangerous situations that leave them with no choice 
but to use deadly force . . . officers cannot escape liability when their 
 
 99. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. 
 100. See Elie Mystal, The Supreme Court Makes It Even Easier For Cops To Shoot You, ABOVE 
THE LAW (May 30, 2017, 1:15 p.m.), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/05/the-supreme-court-makes-
it-even-easier-for-cops-to-shoot-you/?rf=1. 
 101. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 102. Id. at 187.  
 103. See Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1545 (District Court found an officer liable on a warrantless 
entry claim, and two deputies liable on a knock-and-announce claim). 
 104. James Byrd, As a Matter of Law and Policy, the Ninth Circuit’s “Provocation Rule” Must 
Stand, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (Feb. 9, 2017), http://harvardcrcl.org/as-a-matter-of-law-and-
policy-the-ninth-circuits-provocation-rule-must-stand-2/. 
 105. Id. (stating that the provocation rule is partly motivated by the notion that it is important 
to hold law enforcement officers liable for the foreseeable consequences of all of their constitutional 
torts); see Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]f an officer’s provocative 
actions are objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, . . . liability is established, and 
the question becomes . . . what harms the constitutional violation proximately caused.”). 
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own unreasonable conduct leads them to use avoidable force.”106 The 
Provocation Rule merely highlights and applies the belief that “the 
warrant requirement is preventive rather than remedial.”107 “The 
warrant process benefits the innocent, law-abiding citizen because it 
provides a check on the government agent’s actions before the agent 
conducts an unconstitutional search and seizure,” which almost 
undeniably leads to a forceful confrontation at the expense of the 
victim of the unconstitutional search or seizure.108 
It is only logical that if an entry into a premises is illegal, the 
illegality of the entry should have a bearing upon the reasonableness 
inquiry of the excessive force claim.109 If the entry is unlawful, officers 
are “essentially bait[ing] you into a confrontation.”110 The Provocation 
Rule exists as a mechanism for ensuring that the reasonableness of the 
entry is factored into the reasonableness of the use of force itself; since 
the reasonableness of the excessive force calls for assessing the 
circumstances the officers were in at the time,111 the reasonableness of 
how they got into the premises where force was used in the first place 
is a logical and necessary factor.112 
Additionally, the Provocation Rule is a mechanism by which 
plaintiffs can seek relief for injuries caused by police force, even if the 
force was reasonable at the time of exertion. “[T]hat the Mendezes 
failed to establish liability for unreasonable force is inapposite to the 
conclusion that the deputies unlawfully entered the Mendezes’ 
dwelling and thereby caused their injuries.”113 Without the 
provocation rule, there is no remedy for the injuries caused by the 
illegal entrance. The rule also gives officers an incentive to obtain 
warrants, knock, and announce themselves before entering a premises, 
thereby avoiding inevitable resulting harm.114 
 
 106. Chiraag Bains, After Creating Danger, Can Cops Use Force with Impunity?, THE 
MARSHALL PROJECT (June 15, 2017), http://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/06/15/after-
creating-danger-can-cops-use-force-with-impunity#.2FCCjAIMw[http://perma.cc/7MPK-BSKQ] 
(last visited Aug. 24, 2018). 
 107. Donald L. Beci, Fidelity to the Warrant Clause: Using Magistrates, Incentives, and 
Telecommunications Technology to Reinvigorate Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 73 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 293, 310 (1996). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Mystal, supra note 100. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). 
 112. See Mystal, supra note 100. 
 113. Byrd, supra note 104. 
 114. Id. 
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E.  The Ninth Circuit’s Causation Analysis 
The Supreme Court found that the Ninth Circuit’s causation 
analysis was insufficient to warrant a finding of a causal connection 
between the entry and resulting force.115 It held that “[p]roper analysis 
of this proximate cause question required consideration of the 
foreseeability or the scope of the risk created by the predicate conduct, 
and required the court to conclude that there was some direct relation 
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”116 It 
has been established that in analyzing causation of tort claims, an 
“actor’s liability [is] limited to those harms that result[] from the risks 
that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”117 The Provocation Rule 
brings this causation principle into practice in the context of enforcing 
Fourth Amendment rights. Additionally, other courts have assessed 
and found proximate causation between an unlawful entry and the 
resulting harm.118 
In applying the Supreme Court’s proper proximate cause analysis 
to the facts in Mendez, it is evident that there is a proximate causal 
connection between the unlawful entry and the force used, which 
ultimately led to the Mendezes’ injuries. The “foreseeability . . . of the 
risk created”119 by the unlawful entry was high, considering that the 
officers did not know who they would find inside the shack; 
consequently, the possibility of surprise to the individual(s) inside was 
high due to the officers’ failure to announce themselves. This surprise 
is what led Mendez to quickly pick up the BB gun that was beside his 
bed when the officers abruptly entered.120 Had the officers announced 
themselves, it is highly probably that Mendez’s “natural impulse” 
would not have been to pick up his BB gun, but instead would have 
 
 115. Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1549 (2017). In its causation analysis, 
the Ninth Circuit simply asserted that “an announcement that police were entering the shack would 
almost certainly have ensured that Mendez was not holding his BB gun when the officers opened 
the door. Had this procedure been followed, the Mendezes would not have been shot.” Mendez v. 
Cty. of Los Angeles, 815 F.3d 1178, 1193 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 116. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1548–49. 
 117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 
(AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
 118. See, e.g., Attocknie v. Smith, 798 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Cherry’s entry of 
Aaron’s home was clearly contrary to well-established law. He is not entitled to qualified immunity 
on the claim of unlawful entry. And because a reasonable jury could determine that the unlawful 
entry was the proximate cause of the fatal shooting of Aaron . . . we need not decide whether Cherry 
used excessive force when he confronted Aaron.”). 
 119. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1548–49. 
 120. Mendez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 815 F.3d 1178, 1193 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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been to place it on the ground before allowing the officers to enter.121 
“Realizing that officers were nearby, he would have likely kept his BB 
gun far away from his person.”122 “Without the BB gun element,”123 
the officers would not have thought Mendez was aiming a gun at them, 
and would have not fired their weapons; consequently, the Mendezes 
would not have been injured.124 This “direct relation between the 
injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged” would satisfy the 
Supreme Court’s proximate cause analysis.125 
Furthermore, courts have found that knocking and announcing 
one’s presence can help prevent “violent confrontations that may 
occur if occupants of the home mistake law enforcement for 
intruders.”126 In analyzing the causal connection between an 
unconstitutional entry “which arises from intentional or reckless 
conduct,” courts have also found that such entry would “proximately 
cause the subsequent application of deadly force.”127 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Because the analysis of an unlawful entry claim and an excessive 
force claim lead to the same conclusion in practice, the effect of the 
Provocation Rule is not at odds with the Fourth Amendment. 
Additionally, an independent causation analysis of an unlawful entry 
and the resulting force shows that an unlawful entry will almost 
always lead to provoked force and resulting harm; this close causal 
relationship is at the heart of the Provocation Rule, and supports its 
constitutionality. 
 
 121. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460–461 (1948). 
 122. Katherine A. Macfarlane, Los Angeles v. Mendez: Proximate Cause Promise for Police 
Shooting Victims, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 48, 61 (2018). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Byrd, supra note 104 (“Each link in the causal chain was the foreseeable consequence of 
its preceding link. Indeed, in McDonald v. United States, Justice Jackson discussed the ‘grave 
troubles’ police may encounter after unlawfully entering a suspect’s home, including the resident’s 
“natural impulse” to shoot.” (quoting McDonald, 335 U.S. at 460–461 (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 125. Id.; Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1548–49 (2017). 
 126. United States v. Combs, 349 F.3d 739, 744 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 127. Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1191 (9th Cir. 2002). 
